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Book Reviews 
Chaucer, Langland, and the Creative lmaginntion by David Aers. London, Boston 
and Henley: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980. Pp. xii + 236. $25.00. 
The U creative imagination" of the title is dialectical in its perception of the 
gap between traditional ideologies on the one hand and new forms of consciousness 
and social being on the other. David Aers associates Langland and Chaucer in this 
study because each possessed such an imagination, which led him to an 
awareness of the problematic nature of traditionally-sanctioned views of reality. 
The first three chapters deal with occasions in the B-text of Piers P IOW11zan 
in which Langland acknowledges a tension between his own consciously-held 
ideological positions and the imaginative versions of social reality which he has 
imported into his poem. Chapter 1 argues that the poet-narrator and other 
spokespersons endorse a view of society as a static hierarchy of estates, but 
that this view is rendered problematic by representations within the poem of 
social fragmentation and self-interested social practice. Chapter 2 applies a 
similarly structured argument to Langland's treatment of the Church. Although 
Langland regards the Church as a centralized, hierarchical, and wholly authoritative 
institution, his imaginative t engagement with contemporary ecclesiastical realities 
leads him to acknowledge its corruption by secularism and economic individualism. 
Aers notes that revealed contradictions be.tween traditional ideologies and social 
practice could well have led to apocalyptic resolutions, and he devotes Chapter 3 
to an examination of instances in which Langland ultimately rejects the "temp-
tation" to adopt such systems with their promises of total clarification. He 
views Langland's resolution as private, anti-institutional, and anti-millenial, ex-
pressed through Conscience's final exit from Holy Church in quest of Piers 
and Grace-" a lonely and individualistic pursuit of grace outside the traditional 
institutions" (p. 79). 
Framing Aers's four chapters on Chaucer is a discussion of the II reflexive " 
imagination-an imagination which "discloses the processes by which authority is 
constructed, its grounds in individual and social consciousness and practice" 
(p. 82). Unlike Langland, who was impelled into such critical thought only 
by the clash between his ideology and his ima.ginative rendering of social reality, 
the mature Chaucer seems to have been predisposed to such habits of mind by 
personal tendency and social context. In the course of Chapter 4, we are shown 
several instances in which characters either exhibit or refrain from reflexive 
thinking: ·the Wife of Bath (with her II de-sublimation" of authoritative texts), 
the Pardoner (who reminds us of the human perspective of those who create 
authoritative texts), and the Parson with his implicitly criticized failure of 
reflexivity. Chapter 5 returns to the argumentative line of the Langland chapters. 
revealing a contradiction between Criseyde's aspirations and the vulnerability of 
her social situation, and defending her conduct on that ground. Chapter 6 
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continues in a complementary vein with certain of Chaucer's "critical and 
reflexive meditations on medieval marriage" (p. 151). The concluding chapter 
returns to the early theme of social hierarchy, arguing that the Knight's Tale 
actually undermines notions of benign social harmony and that Theseus's 
"Firste Moevere" speech represents a ruler's effort at sacralization of his own 
government. 
This study is praiseworthy in its determination to move beyond superficial 
consideration of social "backgrounds 11 into the interplay of traditional ideology 
and social developments which challenge traditional formulations. In my view, 
its strengths derive from those sections in which its thesis is most fully illustrated, 
its weaknesses from those ,at the moments at which it is most taken for granted. 
By this standard, the Langland sections-while more brief-are more authoritative 
in their demonstration of the clash bet\veen his consciously-held beliefs and his 
imagina.tive engagement with social issues. A further aspect of these sections 
is their attempt to mobilize in the service of literary criticism such terms and 
concepts of social analysis as ideology, mediation, and dialectic. These concepts 
enrich this line of argument, though some further definitions and explanations 
would be desirable. "Ideology," for example, seems at times to refer in a neo-
Marxist sense to the biased or illusory views promoted by a dominant social 
class, and at times to refer more neutrally (in a sense based on Kuhn's theory 
of paradigms) to all traditional systems of belief as they become subject to the 
strain of new social issues. 
Chaucer's disinclination to put forward overtly ideological statements necessitates 
a shift in Aers's argumentative strategy, and his emphasis on Chaucer's" reflexive" 
imagination is a reasonable adjustment. Yet he might have done more to 
describe the social considerations which engendered this habit of mind. He 
suggests in several provocative asides that Chaucer's reflexivity was paralleled by 
contemporary trends in theology, that Criseyde's social situation duplicates that 
of fourteenth-century women of equivalent social class, and that the political 
world of the Knigbt's Tale exhibits significant" continuities" with Chaucer's own. 
These promising suggestions are not, however, developed into a full theory 
of Chaucer's imagination in its social setting. In consequence, his" reflexivity" 
often seems to differ little from those qualities of ironic awareness noticed 
by formally-oriented critics of the previou's three decades. In a series of local 
arguments, Aers shows with considerable verve that Chaucer held humane views 
on such issues of t\ventieth-century interest as militarism and the position of 
women in society. Despite their interest and presumable congeniality to the 
twentieth-century reader, these arguments do not advance his overall social 
hypothesis as much as would a more systematic demonstration of the relations of 
Chaucer's art with fourteenth-century social existence. 
Even with such criticisms taken into account, this remains an invigorating 
study. It worthily joins works by such British medieval scholars as Rodney Hinton, 
Gordon Leff, Derek Pearsall, and Elizabeth Salter, who have raised parallel 
questions in several interrelated disciplines in a similarly probing and undogmatic 
spirit. 
PAUL STROHM 
Indiana University 
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Tennyson and Clio: History in the J1ajar Poems by Henry Kozicki. Baltimore and 
London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979. Pp. xvii + 185. $12.50. 
Tennyson and Tradition by Robert Pattison. Cambridge, Massachusetts and 
London, England: Harvard University Press, 1979. Pp. 178. $14.00. 
New studies of Tennyson perhaps inevitably begin with attempts to show 
that he was intelligent and well-infonned, something morc than a sensitive plant. 
This is not just because Vi,r. H. Anden once stupidly caned him "the 
stupidest" English poet. TIle very structure of Tennyson's poctry-self-
doubting, presenting" vacillating" s.tates of mind, idyllic and elegiac-suggests a 
poet more concerned with heart than with head. But there cannot be much 
question that Tennyson follO\ved the social, scientific, and theological contro-
versies of his age closely and intelligently. 
Whether such attention to the main intellectual currents of his age led 
Tennyson to develop a systematic philosophy is another matter. Defenses of 
his intellectual cogency run the risk of making him out to be too systematic, too 
philosophical. This is the major '\veakness of Henry Kozicki's discovery in 
Tennyson of an evolving" philosophy of history" on a nearly Hegelian scale. 
Of course Tenyson's muse is Clio: there is nothing controversial about the 
claim that "if any single interest appeared to dominate Tennyson's work and 
thought, it was his concern about the whence and whither of human affairs" 
(p. xii). "",Vhat Kozicki very usefully shows is not that Tennyson developed a 
full-fledged "philosophy of history," but that his thinking about history, 
responsive to many of the intellectual currents of his day, was more complex, 
subtle, and profound than a mere unfocused curiosity about whence and 
whither. 
Kozicki's decade approach at times seems mechanical and unconvincing, as 
when he claims that Telmyson's "philosophy of history ... breaks apart in the 
seventies and even more so in the eighties as the three main ideas that once had 
composed it begin to fragment into independent units" (p. 164). This only 
begs the question of the extent to '\vhich these" three main ideas" (providence, 
historical process, heroism) formed "a unity of thought" during earlier 
decades. Kozicki shows that they more or less did hang together earlier, but 
not that they fall apart in the seventies and eighties. Tennyson grows more 
pessimistic; providence seems more remote; the historical process looks more 
muddled than ever; and heroism seems more infrequent than ever. But these 
are still main categories in Tennyson's thinking about history. 
If Kozicki does not always acknowledge the confusions and lack of system in 
Tennyson's ideas, he is still full of insights, perceptive readings, and useful 
information about the contexts of Tennyson's social thought (the Cambridge 
Apostles, Broad Church theology, and so on). These contexts he explores as 
helpfully as anyone since Jo1m Killham (Tennyson and the Princess, 1958). And 
the demonstration that Tennyson had coherent although changing ideas about 
history is itself a valuable addition to our understanding of his complex greatness. 
Because Kozicl{i interprets Tennyson's conservative social ideas as ideas, having 
philosophical depth beyond mere emotional reactions to immediate events, the 
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poet as social and historical thinker joins the poet as intellectual reconciler of 
science and theology. 
Robert Pattison's fine study of Tennyson's classical sources is not so \vide-
ranging nor so risk-takin.g as Kozicki's, but it is also ,about history. By treating 
poetic tradition as a synecdoche for tradition (or hi9tory), he suggests that his 
hunt for sources and influences is also an :analysis of tradition and innovation as 
Tennyson's central values. vVhether poetic tradition can actually stand for 
tradition in general in Tennyson is questionable. But Pattison is very good at 
showing how the poet adapts classical forms-idyll, epic, elegy, epithalamium-
to his own uses, thus "iewjog him as an innovative traditionalist or, perhaps, as a 
romantic classicist. 
Pattison almost does for Tennyson and the idyll what Robert Langbaum did 
for Browning and the dramatic monologue, except that the Tennyson who 
emerges is not unfamiliar. After Christopher Ricks, Dwight Culler, James 
Kincaid, and the other recent critics mentioned in Pattison's acknowledgments, 
no one will find tllls portrait of Tennyson I< as a craftsman consciously working 
within a long and complex tradition of poetic forms" (p. 1) at all moot. J. M. 
Gray, Douglas Bush, and others have already covered much of the ground of 
Tennyson's classical sources. And tl:ere is something foned about Pattison's 
framing of his argument: he retu.cns through G. K. Chesterton all the way to 
John Churton Collins to find critics to do battle with. But Pattison's first 
chapter is his weakest. Once he delves into the "long and complex tradition" 
of Thcocritean idyll, Homeric epic, and the rest, he produces numerous useful 
judgments, based on solid scholarship, about how the poet worked and grew, and 
about how the tension of tradition and innovation yielded the organic unity that 
is often not visible on the surface of the poetry. 
Pattison may err on the side of making the poet out to be too conscious and 
systematic in his classicism, just as Kozicki errs by making him out to be too 
systematically philosophical. Between the bleeding heart melancholic and the 
intellectual systematizer most recent critics have preferred the latter. But 
perhaps all efforts to rescue Tennyson from Auden's accusation and its variants 
are welcome and useful, as are these. 
PATRICK BRANTLINGER 
Indiana University 
.! Ge1'ard de Nerval: The j\1ystic's Dilellnna by Bettina L. Knapp. University, 
Alabama: The University of Alabama Press, 198. Pp. viii +372. $21.50. 
Gerard de Nerval (1808-1855) is the first French writer to have used his dreams 
s as primary subject matter in his writings. His images attain an archetypal and 
d .' universal sigpificance. Attracted to the occult, he introduced alchemical images 
and objects into many of his works. 
Bettina Knapp explains that her study attempts" to evaluate Nerval's dreams 
u along philosophical, aesthetic, and psychological lines." Nerval's dream motifs 
express his interest in a vast range of mystical topics and religious sects. The 
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critic describes the latter in, the course of the book, enabling the reader to draw 
parallels between Nerval's approach and ours to questions of sin, guilt, redemption, 
and death. Having lost his mother at an early age, Nerval idealized all women, 
but suffered when his picture proved untrue. As a way of release, he resorted 
to figures such as Isis and the Virgin Mary, withdrew from life into his dream 
realm, losing touch ,vith reality and ending his life in suicide. 
Knapp interprets Ncrval's growing insanity, stressing his interest in the occult 
and dreams, discussing their impact upon his literary productions. The first of 
the book's three parts (" The First Darlmess") deals with the young writer's 
attraction to the dead and to Germany, the country in which his mother was 
buried: at nineteen he translated Faust 1. Under the influence of a great-uncle, he 
became interested in mythology and the occult, responding later to his friend 
Charles Nodier's encouragement to explore the unknown. In 1834 he met 
his life's passion, the singer Jenny Colon, \vho, as an anima figure, joined his 
former Platonic loves, but also became for him the Divine Mother and Wife: 
he v.ras sure that if she did not love him in this life, she would in another one. 
He associated her with the Queen of Sheba and wrote for her the libretto of 
an opera of this title. After her marriage in 1838, he wrote her eighteen letters 
(probably never sent) in which he developed the themes of sacrifice, of mother 
and child, and of the son-lover. His love for her, after she died in 1842, took 
on the proportions of a myth. Not surprisingly, he wrote, with Alexandre 
Dumas, a drama called The Alchemist. In 1840, he started to translate Faust II, 
which confirmed his belief in reincarnation. The next year, he was committed to 
a mental hospital for the first time. From then on, he constantly mixed fantasy 
(or dream) with reality, experiencing repeated episodes of insanity. 
The second part of Knapp's study deals with Nerval's travels in the Middle 
East, from which he brought back his strange Voyage in the Orient, an odyssey 
of his soul and of his initiation into the mysteries of death. Fascinated with the 
dream visions of Francesco Colonna, with the legends of Caliph Hakim and of 
Solomon and the Queen of Sheba, he made them into archetypes. The third 
section of the book examines Nerval's Daughters of Fire, which consists of six 
tales, about six heroines, aU fire spirits. For him, fire was associated with solar 
symbolism, the sun synonymous with creative energy, a guide to man in his daily 
ventures. On the whole, this is an interesting study of the hermetic sources and 
symbols of a sometimes radically esoteric writer. 
FERNANDE BASSAN 
Wayne State Uni-versity 
Henry James: The Later Novels by Nicola Bradbury, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1979. Pp. 228. $32.00. 
Not since Ruth Yeazell's Language and Knowledge in the Late Novels of 
Henry ] cmzes has anyone given the close attention to verbal structures in 
James's fiction that is manifest on every page of Nicola Bradbury's study. 
Without overly insisting on the sanctions in precedent and theory for her 
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critical procedure, she takes her cues from William James's insights into the 
expressive connections between linguistic units and states of consciousness, from 
de Saussure's definition of language as a "system of differences)) that grounds 
meaning on differentiations of verbal forms, and from Seymour Chatman's 
analysis of grammatical and syntactical forms in James's late style. Intensive, at 
times microscopic, attention to such linguistic and stylistic matters enables her 
to define subtleties in motive and attitude among characters, but also to 
heighten the significance of non-verbal forms and to discover, in a reader's 
response to the process of "representation "-to the acts of expression and 
communication that constitute full "representation" -the centml concern that 
links reader, author, and protagonists in James's novels. 
"The" reader is decidedly the alen reader for whom James wrote, described 
here as at times puzzled or partial in his understanding but elevated finally, as 
in most" reader-response" criticism, to the hypothetical status of "the most 
alert reader" imaginable, who proves to be completely in tune with the 
author's design, though protagonists ~re slow to attain, or incapable of attaining, 
that status, and though earlier, even" attentive critics," have failed to qualify. 
Bradbury'S first chapter is devoted to the representational functions of silence 
as she can demonstrate them to be in The Portrait of a Lady, the novellas What 
Alaisie Knew and Tbe Awal?ward Age, and Tbe Sacred Fount: the unspoken 
dialogue of exchanged glances, tacit elisions, the "hush" of approaching death, 
or the ". narrative silence" created by the evasion of crucial episodes and 
the resort instead to indirection. Silence, whether helpless in the face of the 
inexpressible, or deliberate in the face of the unspeakable, is a representational 
resource for James because it operates at the" interstices of formal expression" 
and, "reaching toward moral and even metaphysical significance" as a symbol 
of isolation, it is flexible, "unquantifiable ,., in its "form, or lack of form." It 
can reveal the machinations of "conspirators" and "manipulators" in certain 
roles and contexts, or the integrity of moral paradigms in others. The 
chapter is lucid in establishing its distinctions but too cursory in its coverage 
to provide convincing readings of the works it takes up. 
To provide such readings becomes the aim of separate chapters on the three 
novels of the" major phase," and Bradbury's approach is adjusted significantly for 
each. Her approach to The Ambassadors responds to the predominance of 
visual and painterly imagery in the work. She applies Rudolph Arnheim's 
analysis of visual perspective as terminating in a "vanishing point" that is 
suggested rather than actually drawn, and that projects therefore an "infinity" 
beyond the converging lines that graph it. Correspondingly she finds that 
Strether gradually is brought to a compeletness of vision that writer and reader have 
earlier attained, a "still point" (defined by T. S. Eliot's high Anglican Four 
Quartets) that lifts Strether, for all ,his limitations, into the" freedom of absolute 
nlorality" ; the "vanishing point" becomes the" absolute" realm of "right and 
wrong." 
Bradbury's meticulous examination of linguistic patterns, the particularities 
of ~anguage, in the chapter on The Ambassadors, is the strongest feature of 
her book, but it becomes increasingly apparent that other considerations, im-
ported and imposed or less intensively examined, are governing her analysis, 
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leading her to ignore the charged cliches and the usages of social decorum in 
Strether's speech (Chad would be "a "brute," and U guilty of the last infamy ") 
when transporting Strether to the realm of "absolute" moral vision. 
In Tbe Wings of tbe Dove, Bradbury finds "no guiding rule of technique 
dominating every expressive element," a. shifting stance or a "disjunctive ten-
dency" in place of ".central perspective." Accordingly she grounds. her 
analysis on the attempt of characters to read their own story and, helpless to 
alter their fate, attain an "understanding" or "awareness" that becomes, in the 
case of the heroine, an "objective appreciation" that is "on a level with the 
author and reader," an "understanding inseparable from the author's own." 
Verbal analysis implements this forced severance of Milly from her world 
without convincingly justifying it. After first stripping Milly of any archetypal 
or national significance that has been claimed for her by other critics or by 
characters in the novel, so as to insist on her personal and human presence and 
her movement in the social world of Kate and Densher, Bradbury views Milly 
in her ethereal "transcendence II as II unscathed" by her usage at the hands of 
others, free of the world's II constraints." Verbal analysis, however, is not 
sufficient to distinguish characters' "manipulative categorization of other people" 
from James's own. Bradbury's reaching for parallels (often based on echo and 
"half-echo") to Vanity Fair and Otbello, her clear cut differentiation of pro-
tagonists from villainous "conspirators" and other characters, and her emphasis 
(following John Bayley and A. C. Bradley) on cbaracters themselves at the 
expense of dramatic action, are no substitute for the concern with the book's 
dramaturgy that the work demands. 
The culmination of Bradbury'S study is the chapter on The Golden Bowl. 
(A "Conclusion" largely reiterates claims already fully presented, and the 
penultimate chapter on the II Last Works II takes up the later fiction and non-
fiction swiftly in an effort to declare that they will not sustain the interest· of the 
three great novels.) Here she acknowledges explicitly what has been implicit in her 
analysis all along: that the novel's language must be considered in its interaction 
with II actions" and II characters," or with the larger contours of II scene-sequences." 
Although Bradbury's focus is thus widened as it must be, her rhetoric is channeled 
narrowly into the effort to exonerate Maggie from charges brought against her 
by her harshest critics (" We suspend narrow condemnation in the interests of 
a larger propriety") and to smooth out the moral complexities of the action 
and of James's responsibilities in writing it. The verbal analysis is at times 
finicky (there are virtually ludicrous claims made for the repetition of "for" 
in one sequence), and a firm though vaguely defined decorum is invoked as a 
standard against which to measure stylistic features which become conspicuous 
and suspiciously expressive in James: the "stylistic exuberance," the II excess" of 
melodrama, verbal statement, and imagery in the fiction. Some such features, 
Bradbury has explained earlier, elicit "the" reader's sympathic engagement 
with the characters, while others provoke a more detached "intellectual. rather 
than imaginative, attention." In either case Bradbury responds to, them in 
such a way that they indicate corrosions, distintegrations, or incompletions, 
blindness or groping apprehension, on the part of fictive characters, while 
indicating at the same time that James's control is "flawless," that he and his 
narration are not implicated in the characters' fantasies or maneuvers. Only 
i 
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in The Golden Bowl does he acknowledge that some "excesses" of imagery, 
easily excused by Bradbury, are also his own. 
The issue that proves to be central to her reading of James is the issue of 
his authority, the complications of which she suggests at points despite her 
overemphasis on James's and the readers' relation to protagonists or "centers 
of consciousness" among the fictive characters. Recognizing at the end that 
six characters in Tbe liVings of the Dove are, "to some extent, authorial figures," 
she can only conclude: "how different arc their authority and reliability, and 
how little relation this bears to their waddy position!" James grounded his 
authority on analogies to painting and drama which Bradbury recognizes but 
does not examine, and, as Tbe Golden BWJJl's Preface makes clear, on a 
complicitous involvement V\rith his characters that eludes the moral perspective 
which enables Bradbury so easily to distinguish" conspirators" from protagonists, 
or the "materialism" of a character in one novel from the purchasing power 
of a millionaire in another. The" exploiting" and "manipulating" that she 
remarks in James's use of his materials bear no relation in her view to the 
exploitation and manipulation that she condemns in the behavior of his characters. 
James's exercise of authority entailed hazards, moral risks, of a kind that Bradbury 
is eager to recognize in some of his protagonists but would ,deny to James 
himself. The" ideal" in Tbe Golden Bowl, she declares, "approximates" 
Keats's" 'Negative Capability,'" the capacity of ", being in uncertainties, mys-
teries, doubts, without any irritable reaching after fact and reason.'" This is an 
enabling imaginative power that Bradbury rightly relates to the novelist's 
"power to guess the unseen from the seen," as James claimed in "The Art of 
Fiction," the "uncertainty" of the '" guess'" that Bradbury asks us to 
recognize in James's best fiction. Yet when she finds Strether the exemplar of 
negative capability she lifts him into a realm of "absolute right and wrong" 
and finds "no uncertainty" in his final words. James's guesses finally, and 
those of an alert reader, have no irresolution in her view; the hazard of guessing 
dissolves in righteous certitude. 
Indeed the term "category" in Bradbury's critical vocabulary defines the 
conventional moral perspective that circumscribes her responses to the verbal 
textures and movement of James's novels, and her use of it suggests problems in 
critical methodology that critics have not resolved and this study dramatizes by 
throwing into relief. Bradbury exposes as reprehensible the "manipulative cate-
gorization of other people" (including the "myth-making process"), or "the 
tendency to categorize experience" in Kate's and Susan Stringham's ima-
ginations in Tbe TVings of the Dove, and, while she exonerates the protagonist 
Milly from the charge, she presents no ground for dissociating James from the 
same activity. Indeed" preserving moral categories of judgment" is crucial 
for Bradbury, and the" miscarrying of the various plots of The Wings of the 
Dove, and of the good intentions of all the characters in the first volume of 
Tbe Golden Bowl" is attributed to "inadequate categorization of experience." 
The hazardous experience of reading James eludes the categories that Bradbury 
applies with so firm a hand to the sensuous surface and the deeper rhythms of 
J ames's fiction. 
LAURENCE B. HOLLAND 
Tbe J alms Hopkins Uni'l)ersity 
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Literary Impressionism, James and Chekhov by H. Peter Stowell. Athens: The 
University of Georgia Press, 1980. Pp. ix + 277. $17.00. 
What is literary impressionism? That is one of the most vexing questions on 
the critical scene today. H. Peter Stowell is aware of the many dilemmas which 
plague the field his book addresses. AB he notes, "Impressionism has always been 
a difficult concept to pin down" ; even worse, "there is little agreement about 
who is and is not an impressionist." The reason for this confusion is that 
impressionism is not one thing but many. It includes, for example, Ford Madox 
Ford's doctrine of novelistic technique, a tradition of unreliable narration in 
fiction, a movement in French painting, a concern with perception in philosophy 
and literature from Hume to Pater and Conrad, and a period of transition in 
the history of the novel from realism to modernism. The list could go on 
and on. No single essence underlies the diverse group of elements which make 
up impressionism. Instead, impressionism is inherendy pluralistic-a "family," 
in Wittgenstein's sense, like the group "games" which has no uniform set of 
features shared by all its members, from chess to football. A" family" consists of 
a series of resemblances and differences, convergences and divergences. The 
challenge for students of impressionism, then, is to clarify and organize the 
relations among its members without overlooking its multiplicity. 
Stowell seeIIl3 to accept this challenge in his very choice of James and Chekhov 
as his central figures. After acknowledging that the differences between these 
two writers might seem more striking than their similarities, Stowell suggests that 
"both their disparities and their affinities reinforce the argument that literary 
impressionism was a widely cast and loosely held net that bound together the 
most unlikely writers, all the while allowing them to swim freely." James and 
Chekhov are related, in Stowell's view, because both respond in their works to 
what Henry Adams calls the" supersensual multiverse." This is a fluid, pluralistic 
world where change prevails over stability, where there -are many "truths" 
which refuse unification into the "Truth," and where the meaning of 
" reality" is open to infinite variation as perceiver and perceived shift in relation 
to each other. By focusing their dramatic attention on the workings of con-
sciousness, these two writers (and their kindred literary impressionists) "dis-
covered modernism." Among their many differences, however, James tends 
to depict characters who struggle relendessly to master and order the flux; 
Chekhov may lift his characters into a privileged moment of synthetic perception, 
but then he plunges them all the more deeply into the tedium of disconnected 
drifting from moment to moment. By mapping convergences and divergences in 
this way, Stowell takes an important step toward understanding impressionism. 
Elsewhere, though, Stowell lapses into monism. He often refers to "im-
pressionism" as if it were a single entity. His long and interesting chapter on the 
distinguishing features of impressionism contains many statements of the sort: 
"impressionism is this" and "literary impressionists do that." One frequendy 
wonders whom he has in mind, since many of his claims fit some members 
of the family but not others. At one point, adopting Joseph Frank's controversial 
argument about spatial form in modern literature, Stowell asserts unequivocally 
that II Literary impressionists, worldng in their temporal art, strove to spatialize 
time." But this does not hold for the complex temporal structure of The Good 
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Soldier. By dramatizing Dowell's rambling efforts to make sense of his past, 
Ford emphasizes that we live forward but understand backward-and that no 
spatial haven of synchronic comprehension can rescue us from the diachronic 
vagaries of anticipation and retrospection. Nor does Stowell's assertion explain 
why Conrad disrupts the time-line of the story in Lord Jim. Conrad's bewildering, 
fragmented narrative aims to upset the complacent confidence of his readers in 
cultural constructs and moral values which arc not eternal verities but only 
historical fictions and hence radically contingent. Ford and Conrad, in their 
different ways, seek not to overcome time but to prompt their readers to reflect 
about the inescapable temporality of understanding and existence. Stowell is 
right that many literary impressionists explore the nature of time by experimenting 
with traditional conventions of narrative order. But" spatial time" is not an 
essential feature of literary impressionism, a value shared equally by all of the 
writers who s'wim in its wide, loose net. 
When he describes the multiplicity of impressionism, Stowell argues that it is 
"not a movement, but a far-reaching cultural phenomenon" which encompasses 
not only literature and painting but also philosophy. Because it heralds the 
modern preoccupation with the status of meaning and the limits to perception, 
Stowell suggests that impressionism anticipates phenomenology. There are two 
advantages to establishing this relationship between art and philosophy. It not only 
advances our understanding of cultural history by charting the emergence of 
modernism across djsciplinary boundaries; it also makes available to the critic a 
useful conceptual framework for analyzing the impressionists' explorations of the 
vicissitudes of consciousness. Stowell's book exploits these advantages with 
mixed success. His study draws on only a very limited range of phenomenological 
concepts, and it is sometimes imprecise in its usc of them. Stowell claims, for 
example, that "The impressionist attempts to capture the feel, texture, and 
consciousness of the phenomenological tabula ram or, in the impressionist lexicon, 
, the innocence of the eye.''' But it is misleading to attribute to phenomenology 
(and to all impressionists) an epistemology which believes that the mind can 
make itself a blank slate. Stowell seems to refer here to H usserl's procedure of 
" bracketing" -the "reduction" which suspends the "natural attitude" of 
unquestioned engagement with the world in order to describe the structures 
of consciousness and experience which go unnoticed because we take them for 
granted in everyday life. The" reduction" is the work not of an "innocent" 
mind, however, but of a trained philosopher ,vith sophisticated assumptions 
and procedures. Furthermore, " bracketing" reveals that consciousness is 
intentionally active rather than blanldy receptive. From H usserl through 
Heideggcr to Gadamer and Ricoeur, phenomenologlsts argue that Immving cannot 
be innocent of presuppositions; in their view. understanding is always directed 
by the assumptions and interests of the observer, always guided by his 
expectations, molded by his temperament, and limited by his situation. 
Stowell quotes MerIeau-Ponty freguently, and the passages he cites are often 
illuminating. Except for an occasional offhand reference to Sartre, however, he 
makes no mention of the other leading figures in the phenomenological tradition. 
Like impressionism, phenomenology is a diverse family. Although Stowell u:;cs the 
term as if it referred to a single set of precepts, its net is wide enough to include 
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Bussed's early idealism and his later turn to the realism of the lived world, 
Heideggcr's quest for Being and Sartre's existential Marxism, Poulet's criticism 
of consciousness and Ricoeur's henneneutics of the symbol. The diversity which 
marks the community of phenomenological thinkers might even provide a helpful 
guide for mapping the multiplicity of impressionism. Henry James seems to 
share Busserl's interest in how consciousness persistently composes the \vorld by 
projecting itself beyond the side of an object presented to it. Ford anticipates 
Merleau-Ponty's fascination with the ambiguities and obscurities of unrcflectiyc 
experience. \Vith Heidcgger and Sartrc, Conrad exposes the nothingness at the 
foundation of existence. Stowell also misses the opportunity to take advantage 
of phenomenology's research on aesthetics. Although he explores the role of 
indeterminacy in impressionist fiction, he ignores Roman Ingarden's theory of 
how literary works represent objects through a stratum of aspects made 
up of gaps and blanks. Stowell discusses the reader's "role as co-maker" and 
"active participant" in constructing a work, but his bibliography is silent about 
\Volfgang Iser's seminal studies of the reading process. 
Stowell divides Chekhov's and James's gro,\vth as writers into three stages: 
"The Emerging Impressionist," "Hesitation and Achievement," and "The 
Impressionist." After an initial period of discovery and exploration, each writer 
makes some progress but also digresses or falls short before attaining his 
ultimate vision. Stowell's own book belongs in his middle stage. Both in what 
it accomplishes and in what it fails to do, his book points in directions ""vhere 
ar.swers may eventually be found to the questions which surround impressionism. 
PAUL B. ARMSTRONG 
Unk'ersity of Virginia 
Conrad in the Nineteenth Century by Ian Watt. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: 
Uni\Tcrsity of Califorru:l Press, 1979. Pp. xvii + 3i5. $21.50. 
Ignoring the deconsrructi\Tc fibrillations of Derrida, the archeological pyro-
technic displays of FOllcault. and all similar innovations, Ian 'Vatt gives us a 
phin, unvarnished Conrad. The elusiye Kurtz in Heart of Darkness originates 
with the agent Klein whom Conrad sa\v dying on the Congo steamer Roi des 
Belges. Yet, there is :m oycrlay of Arthur Eugene Constant I-lodister, a reformer 
\dlO \\'i\S director of the SY71dicat C07J77JlC1'c;a/ du Katanga for a time. Yet, 
again, Kurtz cJiffe:·s from both Klein and I-Jodister while ~howing similiarities 
to numerous other celebrities: Emin Pasha (born Eduard Schnitzer 1840-92), 
,\l;ljor ,\l11sgran.: B'lrnciot. :,md Charles I-Tenry Stokes (141-45). 'Vatt follows 
his method thoroughly ~nd judiciously. He tries to find the origin of Conrad's 
ficrion in his experience, carefully sifting other scholars' scattered evidence. 
\Yithin the limits of \Vatt's plan, his \york will stand as O:1e of the most 
important srudies of Conrad. 'Yatt's unswen"ing adherence to his method is 
Loth the strengTh :md the weakness of his work. 
Beginning \\1th a sketch of Conrad's earlier life (1857-94-), Watt defines several 
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ways in which Conrad was a man divided, bomo duplex. The outlines of this 
period arc well-known: Conrad's family's sufferings as a result of his father's 
opposition to the Czarist rule of Poland, his Uncle Bobrowski's constant scolding 
about the boy's irresponsible ways, his ,apparently self-inflicted "\vonnd in 
Marseilles. In these experiences Watt locates the major themes of Conrad's 
fiction: his pessimistic perspective, his distrust of bourgeois values, his concern 
to transcend Byronic indivdualism to reach a larger loyalty, his interest in 
doomed resistance, heroic defeat, and fidelity. These themes set Conrad 
apart from other English novelists of his time and are rooted in his personal 
experience as well as in the literature of his native Poland. Conrad is torn by 
emotional and intellectual contradiction. His painfully created fiction is his 
attempt to resolve these anxieties. Watt believes that in the face of all forces 
which dwarf individual human effort, Conrad clings to the moral imperative of 
" solidarity" or commitment. As Conrad himself noted, his theme is fidelity. 
Watt devotes a chapter each to explication of four works written in the 19th 
century (Almayer's Folly, The Nigger of the Narcissus, Heart of Darkness, 
I and Lord Jim). When the curious reader turns to the series of Concordances 
.' i and Verbal Indexes to these works by Conrad, it is a bit surprising to sec that 
the word solidarity docs not ocour at all in A/mayer's Folly, nor Heart of 
Darlmess, and the single occurrence in L01-d Jim does not refer to human relation-
ships. The theme unifying these four works is undenominated in the texts. 
Intuitively, most readers feel that there is a process of development evident 
in these four works. Clearly the shapeliness and economy of Heart of 
Dm'kness is of superior quality to the interesting but slack first novel, Almayer's 
Folly. Watt's explanation of this development is not completely satisfying. 
Almayer himself, of course, originates in the Dutch trader Olmeijer and the 
topography of Conrad's Sambir reflects actual settlements astride the Berau 
river. The fiction transforms these experiences to conform to "current 
market formulae" (43), which are contradicted by a drive toward the very 
serious French models of Flaubert and Maupassant, so that "Almayer is a 
Borneo Bovary" (51). These aims are incompatible, for the reader luxuriates in 
the romantic fantasies of Nina, while ridiculing her father's inability to escape 
from his dreams. V{att sees this problem as primarily commercial. Conrad was 
trying to reach a much larger audience than Flaubert and so he created "the 
more serious issues» (55) embedded in a cocoon of moonshine. He also notes 
that Conrad's English is a bit awkward in his first novel in its sentence structure, 
repetition, and over-qualification; and he observes that Conrad's prose becomes 
more fluent with each succeeding book. Finally. he sees Conrad as using the 
ironical stance of Flaubert to evade confronting the problems in the character 
of Almayer which were painful for the author personally. 
In The Nigger of the Narcissus \Vatt sees a sharpening of thematic focus, 
which can be clarified by ideas stated by Emile Durkheim's De fa dk'ision du 
tra·vail social, even though it is unlikely that Coruad had read this work. 
Durkheim argues that the division of labor in modern society creates an 
organic unity. In order for such a group to function, it must hal,'e a concensus 
of values and attitudes, Watt sees The Nigger of the Narcissus as the examination 
of organic unity, the ship's crew, under such extreme stress that its solidarity 
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crumbles into a state of anomie, to use Durkheim's vocabulary. The figure of old 
Singleton, after thirty hours, still steering at the wheel of the ship is Conrad's 
affirmation of "The ultimate and universal basis of human solidarity" (125). 
The diachronic movement Watt is tracing in Conrad's works appears to he a 
process of clarifying the author's ideology. Alrnayer's Folly involves issues 
which are clarified to some degree in The Nigger of the Narcissus and which 
will become even clearer in the masterpieces Heart of Darkness and Lord Jim. 
While readers may agree that H cart of Darkness crackles with a power, found 
only faintly pulsing in the earlier works, it is not so obvious that Heart of 
Darkness compels because of its ideological sharpness. Is Heart of Dm'kness 
remarkable because it is Conrad's "ideological summa" (148)? 
When Watt turns to Heart of Darkness his study repeatedly turns up 
matters of biographical -and historical fact which significantly color our 
understanding of the text: when Conrad began to write for Blackwoods, he 
acquired a new sense of audience; in the current myth of "going native," 
Conrad might see the process of his own denationalization; in the vision of 
the Imperial mission in popular writers like Kipling and Rider Haggard, the 
virtues of duty, military discipline, and technological efficiency provide the 
assumptions scrutinized in Conrad's story. Watt is less satisfactory in dealing with 
the problem of nonnative judgment in the work. If dus text sums up Conrad's 
worthwhile thinking on historical and social problems, why is it finally so opaque, 
so inconclusive? The argument that "inconsistencies in Conrad's attitudes to 
colonial and racial problems must in general be understood in their historical 
context" (160) does not explain why modem readers should find an "incon-
sistent" ideological position gratifying. Watt's judgment that "Heart of 
Darkness . .• endure (s) . as the most powerful indictment of imperialism" (161), 
is not self-evidently true. Marlow, in the final scene, does lie to the Intended 
bride of Kurtz, so concealing the true horror of the European presence in Mrica. 
Conrad, too, does not publish his diary of horrible observed facts in the Congo, 
but softens these facts into fictional ambiguities for public consumption. To 
account for the improvement of Heart of Darkness over Almayer's Folly, we 
must acknowledge that Heart of Darkness is systematically obscure, and that 
growing obscurity does not fit easily into the theory that Conrad's works are best 
when most ideologically incisive. 
Watt explains the artful ambiguity of Heart of Darkness as the consequence of 
Impressionism and Symbolism. Literary impressionism has been the subject of 
lively discussion for at least the last decade. Watt refers to the "Preliminary 
Papers" distributed for seminar # 8 at the 1975 annual convention of the Modern 
Language Association. In -fact, there have been five seminars in the last six 
years discussing this topic, as well as recent books on impressionism in Stephen 
Crane, Henry James, and Chekov. Watt's judgment that II it is very unlikely that 
Conrad either thought of himself as an impressionist or was significantly influenced 
by the impressionist movement" (179) is, at best, only partially correct. Watt's 
study plays down the impact of Ford on Conrad and does not see the 
full implication of Conrad's move toward an ambiguously structured text, demand-
ing a highly constructive role of the reader. Watt's consideration of the 
phenomenology of art is deficient. He treats language under the realist assumption 
I, 
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that it refers to an external subject, such as the Belgian occupation of the Congo. 
He also considers the possibility that language is expressive of certain mental 
states and anxieties in the author's or in a oharacter's mind. But he rarely 
looks at a text as an experience. This is a serious shortcoming in any critical 
survey of a piece of literature, but it is especially crippling if the author in 
question is apparently a pioneer in exploring the use of language as a model of 
perception and as a means to manipulate the reader's process of reading or his 
encounter with the artifact of the text. 
Given Watt's method of analysis, his examination of the biography of the 
author and his definition of how the text refers to historical situations, 
it is natural that he should conclude, "What makes reading Heart of Darkness 
so unforgettable is surely the harrowing power with which Conrad convinces 
us of the essential reality of everything that Marlow sees and feels II (252). 
Worb:ing on the theory that stridency of assertion always rises when the speaker's 
doubt in his position increases, we are suspicious of the words II is surely." 
How is II essential reality" different from just plain "reality"? We can 
certainly imagine the opposite assertion, that the reader is captivated by 
Conrad's work because he is constantly reminded that it is a fiction, a tale told 
by Marlow on the Nellie, twice-told by the outside "I" narrator to us. 
If we want to get near II reality," why not read Conrad's Congo diary? Take the 
entry of 3 July, "Met an off(icer) of the State inspecting. A few minutes 
afterwards saw at a camp (ing) place the dead body of a Backongo. Shot? 
Horrid smell." These lines are a good bit nearer the historical reality than the 
inconclusive fiction of Marlow, yet they lack the power of the verbal artifice, 
the conventions of fiction which Conrad constantly manipulates precisely to 
remind his audience t:hat they are reading a story. 
Consider Watt's anthropomorphic assumption in sentences like these: Lord 
Jim II may even have identified with Brown to the extent that he tbought that, 
like himself, Brown ought to be given another chance" (342, italics added). 
It is not unusual for Watt .to vivify characters when he summarizes stories, 
constructing what these characters must have been thinking, what their 
motives must have been, imputing a life to them independent of the words of the 
text, like studying what Hamlet's curriculum at the University of Wittenberg 
must have been before the play began. So, long as the reader knows that he is 
participating in an activity, generated in him by the manipulation of conventions 
in the story, and knows that literary characters do not really have thoughts 
and motives beyond those stated by the text, such constructions are quite 
properly part of the experience of the artifact. But as an explanation of the 
artistic power of the work, Watt is on much sounder ground when he 
acknowledges that Conrad had a theory for manipulating an effect in his reader 
and that he marshalled the techniques of delayed encoding, symbolic deciphering, 
and anachronic oscillation to that end. 
But if we grant that "there is little question that Conrad conceived his 
fiction in terms of a planned sequence of effects on the reader" (306), how 
does his practice square with the aims of the naive moralist? Is Conrad's work 
powerful because he discovered gradually that in this hostile world man must 
maintain his solidarity, his fidelity, to what appear to be shortsighted goals of 
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conduct (as Watt seems to argue on p. 125) or is it pmverful because the 
artful author contrives verbal effects which let his reader glimpse only partially, 
and hidden in a mist of anachronic oscillation and unreliable narration, his kernel 
of truth? Watt \\rants Conrad to give us ma.">cims to live by. like Tom B1'own's 
Sc"ool Days. But what the critic of Conrad must explain is why we continue 
to read his work when it is most cunningly contrived to make the c::'I.traction of 
such maxims from the text virtually impossible. 
TODD 1(. BENDER 
University of Wisconsin 
Fables of Aggression: Wyndhtm'l Lewis, tbe Modernist as Fascist by Frederic 
Jameson. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 
1980. Pp. 190. $11.95. 
V ortel:: Pound, Eliot, and Lewis by Timothy Marerer. Ithaca and London: 
Cornell University Press, 1979. Pp. 231. $12.50. 
"I do not think I had ever seen a nastier-looking man," Ernest Hemingway 
once said of Wyndham Lewis. "Under the black hat, when I had first seen 
them, the eyes had been those of an unsuccessful rapist." Lewis's self portrait, 
leering from the cover of Frederic Jameson's new book, confirms that im-
pression-as do the violence, mysogyny, and fascist rhetoric in much of his 
writing. He was a mean customer, and partly for that reason he is the least: 
read of the so-called classic moderns. Critical studies like Jameson's (or 
Hugh Kenner's earlier work, Wyndbam Lewis) are quite rare. Lewis is one 
of those leopards who has not yet become part of the ritual in the academic 
temple, and when he is pulled out of his relative obscurity he can be made 
to seem as sensational and radical as modernism itself once was. 
Jameson makes a point like this in the introduction to his book, which of 
the two volumes under review is easily the more complex, demanding the 
closer description. It is a small book with a remarkable theoretical ambition, 
trying not only to reclaim Lc\vis as an object of attention, but to resolve a 
couple of the oldest problems in Marxist criticism. First is the longstanding 
debatc over modern art, represented on one side by the followers of Georg 
Lukacs, who see modernism as a decadent, escapist retreat from social realism, 
on the other by the followers of the Russian Formalists and the Tel Quel group, 
who see it as a complex, often contradictory type of revolutionary praxis. Second 
is the debate m"er Freudian interpretation, \"hich seems to be a "materialist" 
method, but which has a tendency to subordinate the political to the personal 
Freud gives a useful model for the understanding of history and myth, but he is 
easily diverted to ahisrorical or purely individualistic concerns, and for that 
reason Marxists hav..:! always had an ambivalent attitude towards him. 
\Vyndham Lewis is a go~d subject upon which to focus these problems. He 
is an obsessiye, pathological type whose work invites Freudian analysis. hut 
as Jameson points out he is also an overtly political writer, rather like a 
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Bernard Shaw grown up in a I< Dosto:vcYSldan social world." A dctermined 
opponent of bourgeois democracy, he might havc become a bscistic mirror-image 
of Shaw, except that he shares the modernist need to rein\'cnt languagc ~md 
narrative form. Within modernism, howcver, he tal{cs up a contentious position, 
placing himself in opposition not merely to nineteenth-century ide(ls of progress 
and realistic represcnmtion, but to the twenties fascination with fa durcc and 
private, impressionistic styles. According to Jameson (and Kenner before him), 
Levlis has an "expressionistic" style similar to the early Brecht, and can there-
fore be exempted from the charges of escapism and abstraction Luk~lcs once 
levelled against the modern novel. As for Lewis's racism and sexism, these arc 
part of what Jameson describes as the" grinding contradictions" in his work; 
they have at least the virtue of being presented openly, "as unbound impulses 
released from the rationalizing censorship of a respectable consciollsness intent 
on keeping up appearances." In plain talk, the man was no \vishy-washy 
libera1. 
Jameson's book sems to me to accomplish (I good deal of its purpose. which 
is a workable synthesis of ideological interpretation, narrati\'e analysis, and 
psycho:malysis. He borrows freely and eclectically from the whole raI1S"e of 
Frcnch post-structnalist theory, and despite his tortured language he often makes 
brilliant points about Lewis_ Ironically, howe,-cr, hc is most persuasivc \yhen he 
approaches Lewis's ideology quite directly and traditionally, showing the con-
tradictions and buricd wounds of social class behind writings like Hitler :md Time 
and rVestern iHnn. As stylistics and psychoal1alisis the book has a good deal 
to offer, but it is somewhat weakened bv a tendency to O\'erst;lte Lewis's 
difference from thc other moderns, and by a slight ~v:1sion of the tensions 
between Marxist and Freudian theory. - ~ 
Jameson is concerned to show that Lewis's novels are "deccntcretl" and 
destructive of what recent French writers call the "humanistic p:uadigm." 
Lewis's prose breaks down the "illusion of an autonomous, centered 'self' or 
personal identity," and according to Jameson it should be contrasted with 
writers like Joyce and \\'oolf, whose internal monologlles are p:1rt nf a 
"subjecth'ising and impressionistic" tendcne~' "'ithin modernism. Of cnurse 
Lewis was also a vigorous proponent of the strong indiyidual, and in a 
Jameson docs not quote he once claimed that" thc Absolute v:011l<l 
individual of inclividu;1Is, the self that has ne\"ef brol{en down.,. fulit:· is to he 
sought in the self or the person." Jameson argue's tlut sl1ch notion" are in 
,"ivid contradiction with Lewis's fiction, and he reads that ficrinn as if it \':ere 
a prefiguration of Lacan's revolution. In Lewis's work, J:1!llcson S:1:;". notion" of 
the" self" or of "ch:1racter" arc shown to he mereh- :1l1 "effect of structure." 
J\lcanwhilc J:1meson assigns the othcr modcrns to the p'lace LuJ.::~ic" put them :--'e:1I's 
ago: the [c:11m of bourgeois indiyidu:tlism, \\'here the cult of pri\'atc pcr~(}ll1ljly 
is fo11O\\"('o to its logical cxtreme. 
Repeatcdl:- J;lme::,~n holds up Jo;:ce :l.!1d "Tonlf :15 Lewis's 
preoccnpied with depth ps~·cholog-:;. the mol jIlSIC. and re.lli'.tic 
In f.lct. howe\'cr. thc intC'rn:ll m()l1olo~\1e, like ;lrt fOf :J.n\ ~:1];:(,. \',~, :11,."" ~ jl1<lj'1.' 
:1(h'crised t11:111 pr:tctieetl. :lnd b~' the ~btc n'."cmies it h.1d beSUl1 if) 
the ycry p:lges of its best :1mhors. \·jrg-inid \"oolf ;ltt:1chd the e.lrl~' 
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of Ulysses precisely because they were centered in a U damned egotistical self," 
and The Waves is surely one of the most sustained demo.Dstrations in literature of 
the illusory nature of individual identity. As for Joyce, he began to dispense 
with interior monologue and realist characterization midway through Ulysses. 
(Jameson seems to me quite wrong when he claims that the "Circe" chapter 
of Ulysses "serves to reconfirm the unity of the psyche.") Finnegans Wake, 
which is not centered· in any consciousness, and which replaces traditional 
characters with Beckett-like "psuedo-couples" such as Shem and Shaun, has 
recently emerged as the ultimate post-structural text. See, for example, Stephen 
Heath's articles in Tel Quel, or Colon McCabe's, new book, James Joyce and the 
Revolution Of the Word-both of which champion Joyce for having virtually the 
same qualities Jameson has assigned to Lewis. 
On the level of psychoanalysis, Jameson proposes a method that will circumvent 
the vexed relation between Freud and Marx. Lewis's perverse ideas, he says, 
should not be analyzed as if they were "familial or archaic," nor as if they 
were located in the "inaccessable" regions of the "private, biographical 
individual" ; instead they should be placed in the" objective configurations of the 
political history of pre-1914 Europe." He never tells us why the history of the 
private individual should be any more "inaccessable" than the presumably" ob-
jective" history of the continent, but he does offer vivid illustrations of how 
Lewis's art, like psychoanalysis itself, was affected by political and economic 
changes. 
One of the most impressive instances of Jameson's skill at merging psychoan-
alysis and ideological interpretation is his penultimate chapter, "How to Die 
Twice," which demonstrates a contradiction between Lewis's belief in the" gifted 
individual" and the satire he constructed to defend that belief. Beginning in 
1928, in the series of books entitled The Human Age, Lewis devised a genre 
described by Jameson as "theological science fiction," in which he violently 
satirized the puppet-slaves of modem society and ruthlessly killed them off, pre-
serving their " souls" in an imaginary afterlife, where their squashed and maimed 
bodies were displayed in special containers. Because these were such obvious 
puppets, Lewis was to some degree absolved of any guilt he might have suffered for 
imagining their deaths; the genre itself gave reassuring proof that they had 
scmehow survived, and since they were not" personalities," they could not be 
subject to real death anyway. In the later volumes, however, Lewis began to 
imagine a sort of Auschwitz ... Hell, where the resurected victims and the angelic 
citizens of the afterworld could die once again, and this time for good. This 
"second death" was a necessary feature of Lewis's imaginary system, because a 
more "real" death had to be constructed in order to preserve the notion of 
individualism. On a deeper level, however, Jameson suggests that Lewis's vision 
of Hell was an enactment of Freud's "death 'wish." Drawing on Laoan's 
interpretation of Sade, he describes the fantasy of second death as " an index of the 
way desire, exasperated by the unsatisfactory immediacy of its nominal fulfillment 
in the here-and-now, seeks perpetually to transcend itself, and to project 
the mirage and the I beyond I of a fuller imaginary satisfaction." Nor is this 
fantasy peculiar to Sade and Lewis; Jameson claims it is felt in the attempt 
of modernism as a whole to construct what Barthes has called a "miraculous 
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stasis," a still-point of genuine Experience, which will relieve the tensions of the 
libido in some ultimate way. 
At this pain: J amesan pauses to observe that the psychoanalytic framework he 
has been using is "ahistorical." "However that may be," he adds, "it is clear 
that such dynamics are peculiarly intensified by that process of reification 
which differentiates our social life from that of every other social formation ... and 
which is uniquely specific to capitalism." I have italicized one of his phrases 
because it opens his argument to some important qualification. If Freudls 
Thanatos is present in all social situations, then" reification " could be detennined 
as much by it as by capitalism. Furthermore the cult of Experience and imaginary 
stasis, which Jameson and Barthes claim are historically specific to modernism, 
are well-known themes of the Romantic movement; indeed one of the major 
problems of Fables of Aggression is that it makes the obsessions of Wyndham 
Lewis sound a great deal like the obsessions which recur in English literarure 
from Wordsworth to Virginia Woolf. 
In raising these objections I do not mean to discount Jameson's argument as a 
whole. His book is the best piece of criticism we have on Lewis, and 
will certainly revive interest in his work. More than that, it is a valuable, sustained 
demonstration of post-structuralist method, addressed to real political issues. 
Compared to it, Timothy Materer's Vortex seems to occupy a sheltered world. 
A conventional scholarly study, Materer's boole describes, largely through quo-
tation, the evolving ideas of Lewis, Pound, and Eliot, who were never 
exactly a" school," but who remained a friendly axis from the 1912-1914 period 
of the London vortex until Lewis's death in the fifties. In seven chapters, 
punctuated with illustrations from the paintings and sculpture of Lewis and 
Gaudier, Materer surveys the failed attempts of this group to make an artistic 
revolution. The major flaw in his book is that he never gives an adequate 
explanation of why the revolution was significant. 
Pound, Eliot, and Lewis were linked by their American origins and by their 
essentially reactionary protest against democracy; nevertheless, in print they 
often made what Pound called" eye-gouging" attacks on one another. Egoists 
all, they never found a journal or a project that would unify them, and their 
culture criticism lacked what Materer describes as a "positive" program. 
Materer discusses the ideas of the group largely in terms of their debates over 
various dualisms: art versus nature, the mechanical versus the organic, the mind 
versus" reality," artistic detachment versus commitment, and so forth. Along the 
way, he talces excursions into the ideas of Gaudier-Brezska and Joyce, who were 
only loosely connected to the central trio, but whose art seems more impressive 
and less doctrinaire. 
Materer's approach is a perfect example of the kind of criticism Jameson 
is reacting against. He performs a useful service in collecting the ideas of 
pound, Eliot, and Lewis, but he treats these ideas as if they existed itt a 
realm of pure thought, and he seems to accept the romantic ethos behind them. 
Frequently he mentions the wars and political events that influenced the moderns, 
but he never stresses the connections between their politics and their art. He 
'leaves their ideology largely unexplored, and speaks in the same idealized 
lW1guage they once used.. The c;omplex, overdetermined relation between art 
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and society never troubles him: instead he moves complacently through quo-
t~tions about H poetry," "culture," and H nature" as if we were all agreed on 
what these terms mean. Ultimately he praises Pound, Eliot, and Lewis for their 
"brave but often embittered campaigns in the field of philosophy and politics," 
and for" the still center of their achievements as artists." Their only deficiency, 
according to this view, was that their tone was wrong, and their politics 
occasionally misguided. Their work is therefore reduced to a set of liberal 
pieties, and their H achievement" goes unexamined. 
JAMES NAREMORE 
Indiana University 
The Rbizome and ,be Floever: The Perennial Philosophy-Yeats and lung by 
James Olney. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 
1980. Pp. xv + 379. $20.00. 
Readers of James Olney's unusual and original book will find in it a great deal 
more than a comparative study of the poetry of "\tv. B. Yeats and the psychology 
of C. G. Jung. Given the absence of contact between these two so like-
minded contemporaries and the lack of influence of either on the other, 
the manifold similarities in their thought provide striking evidence of the 
vitality of the philosophic tradition that is the true subject of this fascinating 
project, "the Platonic system, shaped by Plato himself out of his four great 
predecessors" (9). The informing perspective of tlllS ambitious "exercise 
in the history and psychology of ideas" (x) is set forth in an elaborate "pro-
legomena," where the author argues that 'jj the Yeatsian and Jungian blossoms" 
draw their life from "both an historical rhizome and a psychical rhizome." He 
proposes, accordingly, to trace these flowers back to their roots "in ancient 
Greece and in the collective depths of the unconscious" (13). Whether the 
book succeeds as an analysis of the psychical rhizome will depend in the last 
analysis on the reader's willingness to make a Jungian leap of faith. Clearly 
Olney has done so, for he assumes that U the Perennial Philosophy" is ,j the 
natural and necessary creation of a corporate human consciousr:ess" (12). Thus 
his reconstruction of the temporal development -of ancient Greek philosophy is to 
be constmed at the same time as a dramatization of "the nontemporal story of 
the human psyche in its efforts, conscious and unconscious, to analyze and 
synthesize all the experience that it encounters" (19). 
Two-thirds of the book is devoted to a reading of Plato and the pre-Socrarics, 
and Olney'S saturation in the original Greek texts gives his account an involving 
and authoritative immediacy. His decision to focus his presentation of Platonism 
on Plato himself and his predecessors rather than on his post- and Neo-Platonic 
Successors wisely avoids duplication of the existing Yeats scholarship on the 
subject by Kathleen Raine, F. A. C. Wilson, Morton Irving Seiden, and others. 
A more important reason for this emphasis stems from the author's conviction 
that by pushing his historical inquiry further back in time he is approaching 
~he unconscious origins of hpm~ tJ1ou¥ht: th1,1$ he can speak of Pythagoras as 
, i 
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an exemplar of U archaic man," "who •.. remains in the shadowy darkness at the 
bottom of evel"Y man's mind as he is also at the bottom and the beginning of 
the philosophic mind of mankind" (81-82). These chapters are arranged, 
to be sure, in a diachronic sequence from Pythagoras to Plato, yet Olney's 
assumption of the continuous presence of a psychical rhizome in the human 
mind is displayed in the synchronic unfolding of the argument, which moves 
freely back and forth across the history of Western thought. The effect 
of the constant juxtaposition of the views of Yeats and Jung with those 
of their counterparts in ancient Greece is to stress the ubiquitous presence of 
certain fundamental human ideas rather than their identification with the 
particular individuals who espoused them. In accordance with this synchronic 
perspective, the discussion of each thinker develops a particular topic: the 
chapter on Pythagoras, a theory of aesthetics; the chapter on Heraclitus, an 
account of process philosophy; the chapter on Pannenides, a theory of the 
symbolic mode; the chapter on Empedocles, a thesis on time and history; and the 
chapter on Plato, an investigation of myth and the concept of the whole man. 
The essay on Heraclitus, "Logos and the Sensible Flux," is perhaps the 
finest of the "rhizomatic" chapters. The name of Heraclitus, of course, is 
synonymous with the doctrine that all things axe always flowing. His uncom-
promising vision of both psy che and kosmos as a pluralistic reality of endlessly 
warring opposites is compensated, nevertheless, by a second and complementary 
teaching: "behind all change is a constant law, a secret order behind chaos, 
M')'of in 'll"aVTlt Pet" (99). The tension between these doctrines of Heraclitus 
embodies the same balance between pluralism and monism that chaxacterizes the 
thought of Yeats and Jung. Olney concedes that his synthesis of Heraclitean 
doctrine "goes far beyond anything Heraclitus ever said· or perhaps could 
have said" (122). Embracing the example of Yeats, Jilllg, and Nietzsche, he 
readily acknowledges that he is teasing "a system and a universe ..• with all 
the assistance Heraclitus can give us, out of the shadows and tendencies of our 
own minds and out of the dark depths of the collective human mind" (123). 
This is the author's approach to his subject here and throughout the book, and 
with it he illuminates as never before the dark, paradoxical utterance of the cosmic 
fragments. 
With the treatment of myth in the chapter on Plato, Olney reaches the 
heart of his argument: man's limitations compel him to resort to "mythic 
speech" in his unending quest for lmowledge. It is this myth-making pro-
pensity that links the myths in the Platonic dialogues to the quantum theory of 
Werner Heisenberg, the poetics of Yeats to the analytical psychology of Jilllg. 
Jilllg is the key figure here, for his work not only exemplifies but addresses the 
psychological dynamics of man's creation of symbols. A later chapter, "Psychol-
ogy of the Pleroma," develops Jung's conception of the psyche as a system, 
and given the intrinsic difficulty of both the concepts involved-the collective 
unconscious, the archetypes, the individuation process-and Jilllg'S sometimes 
cryptic, often shifting ,account of them, the exposition is admirable for its 
elarity. 
Much the same could be said of the chapter on Yeats, which persuades that the 
apparent eccentricities of his thought-his preoccupation with the arcane and 
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the occult, with gyres and cones-are" centric" in every way. In the experience 
of revelation, recorded in A Vision and in so much of the visionary poetry, 
personal emotion js transformed into general truth, the mind of the poet becomes 
one with the mind of mankind. Yeats's poetry reenacts this lived experience of 
the truth of "the Perennial Philosophy," and in a series of masterful readings-of 
"Easter 1916," "The Circus Animals' Desertion," H Lapis Lazuli," and" Among 
School Children "-Olney demonstrates the pervasive presence in the poetry of 
a progress "from ego to eidos," from the "temporal world about us to the 
eternal world of the work of art" (278). 
The concluding chapter fonnulates the fundamental question posed by the 
entire inquiry: whether man's building of systems is not merely a wishful pro-
jection of his need for order. The author's own answer comes in the form of a 
credo: "All varieties of system-whether philosophical, psychological, theological, 
cosmological, aesthetic, musical, or poetic-are all, by their structural order, 
hierarchical imitations of the prevailing harmony that is the creative principle 
behind and throughout the universe" (368). James Olney's searching analysis 
of the psychology of system-making parallels Frank Kermode's anatomy of man's 
creation of fictions in Tbe Sense of em Ending, and it deserves to be similarly 
valued for its breadth of vision. At the last, his research emerges as a spiritual 
and autobiographical quest: "The individual discovers meaning in discovering 
a system-a myth, a likely story, a noble risk, call it what we will-that he can 
believe in" (369). And so it is \"lith tllls book: The Rhizome and the Flower, 
consciously designed as itself an imitation in the Aristotelian sense of the 
very subject it addresses, is the latest bloom of that" great-rooted blossomer," 
"the Perennial Philosophy." The intent of this book of wisdom is evangelical, 
designed to bring the reader to ask, with Socrates, "What is the right way to 
live? " 
PAUL JOHN EAKIN 
Indiana University 
Just Play: Beckett's TheatTe by Ruby Cohn. Princeton: Princeton University 
Prcss, 1980. Pp. ix + 3B. $18.50. 
In her third book devoted to the writings of Samuel Beckett, Ruby Cohn 
has decided to "play with Beckett's plays." She wishes to write" an implicit 
appreci:nion through isolation of functional dcyices and theatre aspects," and 
not" an introduction ... still less ... summary, paraphrase or substitute." It is tills 
laITer, howenr, that furnishes the best capsule description of what she has 
written. 
The bool, is divided into three sections: in the first, she summarizes the plots 
of I3echn's twenty published plays in six chapters; in the second, she 
devotes a chapter e:lCh to [\\·0 unpublished plays and the evolution of Fin de 
Partie; the third section's three chaptcrs arc a personal appraisal of Beckett 
directing, persons with whom he has \vorked, and \vorks which are performed 
in genres for which they were not originally \\"fittcll. 
I 
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The first section of the book contains little that is new or important. 
Cohn selects lines or scenes, for the most part chronically, analyzing them in 
terms of place and time, as soliloquizers and fictionalizers, and through repetition. 
This has been done before with varying degrees of success by Cohn in her two 
previous books and by many others. 
If we might liken play to sport, this first section might be her compulsory 
figure skating exercise, in which she dutifully selects the familiar lines and 
passages that, since publication of Waiting for Godot, have been judged the most 
important for scholarship. Pazzo's" They give birth astride of a grave, the 
light gleams an instant, then it's night once more," does double and triple duty 
throughout these six chapters, as do Clov's "Finished" and Hamm's "You 
remain." These are only two of the most noticeable examples repeated and 
made to stand for variants of the same information. 
Cohn takes Not I through four separate explications which differ only 
slightly with each telling, not nearly enough to merit (if we may borrow from 
the author's own vocabulary) so much time and place. Her discussion of this 
play in these first six chapters is a mirror of her discussion of all the other 
plays: she deals with structural variants and offers little discussion that is 
critically interpretive. By Chapter four, the conclusion is obvious that all her 
writing thus far in this book is simply one more version of the enormous 
body of criticism devoted to the reading of these plays, and it demonstrates 
what is already well knO\VIl, that there is virtually nothing left to say about 
them. Cohn makes much of Hamm's "yawn" in this chapter, and like Hamm, 
we, too-yawn. 
In her chapter on fictionalizers which follows, Cohn seems to be taking 
enormous care to keep from saying anything critical or judgmental about these 
plays. Rather than risk interpretive commentary, she prefers to skirt the issues. 
She is almost finished with her compulsory skating, but rather than move into the 
center of the arena to dazzle us with figure skating, she prefers to hug the 
safe and comfortable boards along the edges of the ice. 
Cohn writes that" fiction may camouflage and contradict so as to reach a deeper 
truth," but she is not willing to heed her own words. She moves on in the last 
chapter of this section to verbal repetition, chasing Beckett's" wordshed" from 
Cascando, ", .. risking tedium," ,hoping that" this' churn of stale words' yields 
new precipitates." Unfortunately, it does not. All tlus counting, even though 
bolstered by her creation of new categories (doublets, triplets, distanced 
repetitions, pounders, volleys) is still JUSt a number game that demonstrates more 
the author's patience and ability to count, separate, and make arbitrary distinctions 
rather than aid in the integral understanding of a Beckett text. Only rarely does 
she impart something important, as when she speaks of Beckett dividing a 1971 
Director's Notebook for Happy Days into segments called" Repetition Texts" 
and" Variation Texts," but we wait in vain for more information about this 
notebook because Cohn does not divulge it in its entirety but gives several teasing 
examples of what she meant. For the most part, this section relies on studies that 
have already covered this familiar ground, giving credit to (among others) 
Clas Zilliac~s. Porter Abbott, and John and Beryl Fletcher (who are among the 
noticeable ommissions in her index). 
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What makes this book of value is the middle section, in which Cohn 
discusses Hu:man Wishes, Beckett's 1937 fragment based on the last years 
of Dr. Samuel Johnson, and Eleutheria, the finished three act play that Beckett 
wrote shortly before Waiting for Godot and which has never been published. 
She also devotes a chapter to Fin de Partie and, as she states in her footnote, it 
must serve as an interim study until the fragment of the play sold in July, 1973 at 
Sotheby's becomes available for scholarly perusal. 
Beckett gave the entire manuscript of Human Wishes to C~hn, along with 
two notebooks filled with information about the Great Cham's circle of 
friends and his household. They have rested in a safe deposit box until now, 
and although Cohn has printed the manuscript fragment in its entirety, she only 
reveals partial notebook contents. Of course they are too long to appear 
within this book, but one can't help but wish she had shortened the first six 
chapters to one longish one and devoted more space, perhaps another appendix, 
to the notebooks. 
Again, this collection of material is important, but again, what she has to say 
about it lacks any kind of critical force. She is not above charging that any 
conversation pertaining to Johnson had by Beckett outside her hearing or any 
opinion voiced by him but not in her presence cannot possibily be valid, and she 
goes to great lengths to misread and discredit scholarship that is not to her 
liking. This makes more for suspicion of the reason and rationality of her findings 
rather than of the studies of which she disapproves. Her opinion, for example 
of why Beckett abandoned the Johnson play: "He could not resolve the 
conflict between the realistic biographical drama he had painstakingly prepared 
himself to write and the verbal ballet he actually found himself writing." But 
at this time, 1937, Beckett's published and unpublished writings demonstrate 
clearly that there was no "realistic biographical drama" that he had "pains-
takingly prepared himself to write." This did not come until well after his 
war-time novel, Watt. Cohn cannot bring herself to accept Beckett's own 
reason for giving it up, and she invents this explanation which she contradicts 
on the very next page in her chapter on Eluthbia, where she exp.r:esses surprise, 
"-almost incredible," that Beckett could have written this conventional three 
act play immediately preceeding tVaiting for Godot. It makes her strained 
convolutions of why he abandoned Human T¥ishes even more puzzling, indeed 
suspect. Her" playing" with Beckett's texts once again becomes personal 
diversion rather than textual exegesis worthy of serious consideration. 
Cohn is careful to correct errors she has made in her previous books, but 
it is puzzling (one hesitates to say damaging) that she attributes this reviewer's 
discussion of Elutheria in the biography of Beckett to a manuscript at Hwnanities 
Research Center, Texas, when Footnote 42, page 690 of that book states quite 
clearly that the manuscript's provenance is Baker Library, Dartmouth College. 
In the third and final section of this book, Cohn coins another neologism, 
"Thearricians," (to go with her earlier "Theatereality "), for persons who 
have been associated with productions of Beckett's plays. She gives capsule 
biographies of Roger Blin, Alan Schneider, Billie Whitelaw and a man named 
Rick Cluchey, saying she has chosen to limit her discussion "to those 
I most appreciate." Of these, her discussion of Whitelaw's performance in Not I 
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is the most satisfying, simply because it presents new information. Her 
discussion of Cluchey, a fonner prisoner at San Quentin, now deeply involved 
with a group of actors committed to work in prisons and theatres called the 
San Quentin Workshop, is probably intended to show Beckett's deep humanity 
and to boost that struggling company's fortunes. It is an interesting vignette, 
but out of keeping with the rest of the book. 
In " Jumping Beckett's Genres" and" Beckett Directs," we again have Cohn at 
play, taking information which suits her and changing what does not, shading it 
into a gray area that falls somewhere between kindly intended misinterpretation 
and deliberate misrepresentation. For example, Beckett's ongoing differences with 
.Madeleine Renaud concerning her roles in his plays are not the genteel encounters 
she hints of here, and her account of his problems with Patrick McGee in 
recent years is a travesty of reality. She states emphatically that "There was 
no problem about obtaining Beckett's permission" for David Warrilow to 
turn The Lost Ones into a dramatic performance, but permission was not 
granted to the Mabou Mines Company until the late George Reavey and his 
playwright wife, Jean, interceded. This is a typical example of the kind of 
generalization that makes one regard the entire book with caution. 
We see, in Cohn's Beckett as director, a kind, munificent, entirely admirable 
figure. Reading between the lines we see the rigidity, stubbornness and intrac-
tibility that makes many fine and brilliant actors refuse to have anything to do 
with one of his productions. This is nothing to be ashamed of, and why 
Cohn and others choose to keep it hidden is a mystery. Beckett is that most 
fortunate of artists, one who enjoys such a demand for his work that he has 
the luxury to insist upon its being presented in all the perfection of his own 
personal vision. This makes ,him difficult to work with, but it is nothing to 
distort or to hide. 
Cohn continues, however, to reside in the mainstream of the kind of criticism 
known among many scholars of modern literature as "Becketteering." This is not 
a kind term, rather, it .describes that group which insists upon presenting to the 
world a man so far removed from reality that-to quote a remark Cohn often 
makes-" he is a saint." He is not. He is a perfectionist in his work, and this 
makes him sometimes seem inflexible, determined, even quirky. He is an 
artist who cares about his work, a quality often found in human beings, but 
Cohn insists upon portraying him hagiographically. 
This is true of much of her writing about Beckett. She has knovm him for 
many years and he has given her manuscripts and notebooks which would be of 
enormous value to scholarship. All was given to her in a spirit of open and 
scholarly g2nerosity, but unfortunately, she chooses to divulge it piecemeal, thus 
restricting any critical commentary and evaluation of what she has written. It 
is this insistance on the "insider" approach that gives this book, like her 
previous writings, an aura of acerbity that sometimes borders on the crochcty. 
In general, tIns book does contain a certain amount of important information 
for any Beckett scholar, but it is ultimately dissatisfying. It is so timid. Professor 
Cohn plays, but the play is hesitant and cautious. She takes no chances, makes 
no daring moves, has no sudden darts of intellectual vivacity. One thinks of 
other kinds of play, ·of daring to steal horne in baseball or even in the children's 
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game of hide-and-seek, or the' seerrungly magical penetration by the runner 
of a football line, but here there is only the' careful shooting by a solitary 
player of one lustreless marble around an otherwise empty circle. 
DEIRDRE BAIR 
University of Pennsylvania 
Wallace Stevens: Tbe Making of tbe Poem by Frank Doggett. Baltimore: The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980. Pp. xiv + 160. $12.00. 
In one way or another every reader of Stevens must confront his peculiar 
fonn of obscurity, a deliberate pattern of elusiveneSs using various registers 
of diction and consolidating nearly every kind of image with highly abstract 
concepts. In one line he might make a generalized declaration about the na-
ture of poetry or language or some other theoretical subject one would more 
likely expect in discursive prose. Then in the next line he might offer another 
broad aphorism seeming to contradict the first one, or if not that, he might 
present an abruptly sensual image with no apparent bearing upon the philosophy 
preceding it. His early poems (1915-1931) are not as explicitly theoretical as the 
later ones (1932-1955), but these first lyrics still exert the same kind of 
expository pressure, a force inducing a reader to search out in a work some 
thematic model abstract and general enough to encompass all of that work's 
disj ointed enigmas. 
In the fifties and sixties, the period when the American academy first turned 
to Stevens in an extensive way, the typical approach to tllls obscurity was 
fairly direct. Critics like Louis Martz, Joseph Riddel, and James Beard tended to see 
their task as one of unearthing the thought which the verse was presumably 
concealing or only half revealing. But beginning with Helen Vendler's On 
Extended Wings in 1969, a different approach emerged. Stevens, Vendler stressed, 
was a poet before he was a philosopher. "Abstractly considered," she observes 
scornfully, "Stevens' 'themes' are familiar, not to say, banal, ones." Accordingly, 
her own inquiry would not concentrate on the poet's ideas but would instead 
explore his art, in particular, the way the voice of the long poems becomes its 
own protagonist, one heroically affirming a world that is inherently tragic. 
The extent of Vendler's influence remains an open question, but whatever the 
causes, the seventies did see, with several exceptions granted, a general shift of 
concern away from Stevens' thought in favor of questions of style and influence. 
The advantage of this more recent emphasis is that a poem is easily treated as a 
poem, i. e., a text governed by conditions of meaning that are quite different 
and in some ways far more complex ,than those governing, say, a philosophical 
treatise. By this same token, however, the great disadvantage of this approach 
lies precisely in its weak focus on Stevens' ideas. It characteristically assumes 
that his thought is "familiar" or hopelessly inconsistent or vaguely indeter-
minate or relevant mainly in what it reveals about the influence of other writets-
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some predicate, in other wordsI' ~l1at· will make the conceptual cOhtent of a 
Stevens poem no longer as problematic as "it was, thuS enabling the critic to get 
on with the real task of studying Stevensf art. The difficulty is that Stevens' 
thought constitutes a good part of his art. In fatt it does not take much 
pondering to realize that an accurate description of the rest of his art depends 
upon ail accurate understanding of his thought. Certainly some of the critics of 
the fifties and sixties did on occasion treat Steveiis as if he were some system-
atizing philosopher and were doubtless guilty of other sins of reductiveness. 
but on the whole they more squarely addressed the question of Stevens' 
obscurity; and to my mind his obscurity is a problem that has not gone away. 
Standing among the most important critics of these earlier years is Frank 
Doggett, who in his book, Stevens' Poetry of Thought (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
Press, 1966) and several essays of this same period addressed the relation between 
the poet's obscurity and his ideas as closely as anyone ever did. The Poetry 
of Thought is a carefully wrought book that both compares Stevens' ideas with a 
number of general themes in Western philosophy and at the same time cautions 
continually against the temptation to ascribe ,a body of doctrine to the poet. 
One feature of Doggett's work at this tiine is its immediate, unpretentious 
pertinence to a Stevens poem. Consider, for instance, a point he makes in an 
essay, "This Invented World: 'Stevens' Notes toward a Supreme Fiction'" (first 
printed in ELH, 28 [1961], 284-99): "personification ... is the staple rhetorical 
device of ' Notes toward a Supreme Fiction' .... Each personification is a kind of 
man and at the same time a kind of idea." You can turn to almost any 
part of "Notes," or for that matter many other poems, and see how 
central personification is to the poet's peculiar kind of s~lf-reflexive verse. 
Doggett's point is of the type that may seem obvious only because the principle 
to which it directs us is-once it has been pointed out-so clearly manifest. 
Doggett continued his research on Stevens into the seventies and has now 
culminated this later effort with Wallace Stevens: The Making of the Poem. 
Following the trend of recent years, this study lays enormous stress on what is 
assumed to be the indeterminacy of Stevens' thought. The explicit theory in the 
poet's later style is thus described by Doggett as "tentative and undeveloped" (p. 
112), and the younger Stevens of the twenties is supposed to have considered 
ideas as "extraneous to the real work of the poem II (p. 107). Doggett has 
always been cautious in discussing Stevens, but this latest book turns caution 
into a methodology. In spite of obvious similarities, the A1aking of tbe Poem 
represents a different direction from the earlier Doggett, and I must say 
I like the earlier one more. 
In fairness to this book, I should also note that it has the same undecorated 
clarity and shows the same acuity of the earlier work. Although much of the 
material covered is not exactly new, its commentary still represents a genuine 
contributionj the impression is of someone who has read and struggled with the 
verse for years, someone who can bring a sense of the whole Stevens to everything 
he says about him. Whereas the Poetry of Thougbt looked outward toward 
'Vestern philosophy for its discussion of the verse, the AIaking of tbe Poem con-
fines its scope to the Stevens canon. It first correlates the poet's prose statements 
about poetic theory to his actual practice of poem-making, then moves to show 
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how the lyrics themselves reveal as a body general semantic regularities that 
underlie the meanings of any single work, and finally demonstrates how 
certain stylistic features (like the poet's complex syntactic patterns) are inti-
mately involved with a poem's themes. In using the prose to define Stevens' 
poetics Doggett concentrates more on the Letters (1966) than the lectures of 
The Necessary Angel (1951). This emphasis is unusual but quite appropriate, 
since the letters, especially the correspondence with Ronald Lane Latimer and 
Hi Simons, are closer to the specifics of Stevens' own views about poetry (even 
though the relation between the letters, the theory, and the poetry is mOTe 
complex than Doggett seems to assume). 
The most innovative part of the book is the chapter discussing the "possible-
ness" of the poetry. Doggett sets one of Stevens' favorite words, "possible," in 
opposition to the term" given" as a way of discussing the inductive and deductive 
processes involved in poetic meaning: the" given" is to refer to the indisputable 
infonnation a text furnishes, U its sound and statement 11 (p. 43) and the II possible" 
to the figural connections and conceptual conclusions a reader makes as he 
performs a text, an activity that is vinually endless, since, according to 
Doggett, "the possible ... is a wordless and indeterminate meaning open to 
conjecture .... and, after each conjecture, the possible is still unresolved and 
open for another conjecture" (p. 43). The possible depends on the given, 
and so "not just anything that might come to mind is useful; to be credible, 
explication must be concerned with what is appropriate to the poet's customary 
usage and to the context of the poem" (p. 66). What is interesting here is the 
paradox that seems to emerge: poetic meaning in Stevens depends on his obscurity. 
Although this obscurity obviously does not promote communication in the ordinary 
sense of the term, it nevertheless establishes those conditions through which a text 
is performed again and again, each time in a different way, each time with a 
momentary and unique" life." Under such a program complete intelligibility is 
the very death of meaning. As Stevens says in a letter to Latimer, "as soon as 
people are perfectly sure of a poem they are just as likely as not to have no 
further interest in it; it loses whatever potency it had." This notion that the 
darkness of a text can be the source of its renewability is what makes Doggett 
assume that indetenninacy is built into the very structure of the poem itself. 
Such a conclusion seems to make sense, but I think it is invalid. 
Let me suggest an alternative position by way of a. brief example. In 
discussing the 1944 poem, II The Creations of Sound," Doggett claims that, 
according to the view expressed in this piece, "it is better to think that 
the poem is independent of ego consciousness" (p. 18), that, in other words, 
the actual composing of a poem derives from unconscious processes. Below 
is a passage from that poem with a comment by Doggett immediately following 
it. I have italicized the part of the clause that Doggett does not cite: 
[T]bere are words 
Better without an author, without a poet, 
Or having a separate author, a different poet, 
An accretion from ourselves, intelligent 
Beyond intelligence, an artificial man 
! 
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At a distance, a secondary expositor, 
A being of sound, whom one does not approach 
Through any exaggeration. From him, we collect. 
In "The Creations of Sound," Stevens is concerned almost entirely with 
the theory of t..he involuntary imagination. Many contradictory state-
ments of his about the source of poetry can be considered as emanating 
from a bias for one or the other conception of the nature of creativity, 
as when he wrote Latimer that "writing poetry is a conscious aativity. 
While pO~I,ns may very well occur, they had very much better be 
caused .... 
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Most commentators read a Stevens' poem as if it were a direct reference to 
some aspect of the poet himself; and often, as in this remark by Doggett, 
there is applied a psychology of creativity equipped with the standard oppositions: 
rational/irrational, voluntary/involuntary, and conscious/unconscious. Indeed, 
Stevens does indicate in his prose a profound interest in understanding the nature 
of poetic creativity and often, as the quotation from the Latimer letter suggests, 
uses the same oppositional categories I just mentioned. This interest, moreover, 
involves itself in the themes of the poetry in a number of ways. But this is not 
at a11 to say that "The Creations of Sound" thematizes the imagination in the 
way Doggett claims it does. His remark on what he feels to be Stevens' contra-
dictions is typical and is of a piece with other features of his study, for 
instance his emphasis (but with qualification) on the fact that the poet often 
formed his lyrics in his head so that" essentially a poem was composed before it 
was written" (pp. 36-37): we should not be surprised, the general message seems 
to be, to find the poetry something of a muddle as far as determinate thought is 
concerned. But what is most wonhy of note about Doggett's remark is that 
it does not mOVe an inch to resolve the enigmas themselves; it merely leaves us 
to feel that some of the phrasing could suggest the involuntary imagination. 
Presumably, we are to let the enigmas keep their cloud of indeterminacy. 
But the obscurity of the passage derives not from actual indetenninacy but 
from outright deception. The sense of the poem is, as the title of one lyric has it, 
"The Sense of the Sleight-of-hand Man." Stevens knows very well that we 
shall read "The Creations of Sound)l in terms of the poet himself, even when 
the poem baldly warns us that" there are words/Better without an author, with-
out a poet." Doggett omits the first part of the clause, "there are words," 
but as it turns out, the poem is literally about its own words. Consider the 
following opposition: 
The voice of the poem as that 
of its originator (i. e., the his- vs, 
torical figure, vy~allace Stevens) 
The voice of the poem as that of 
the text (i. C., the words them-
selves here and now under your 
performance) 
As you read the poem, the words create Wallace Stevcns, who in this strict 
linguistic framework is not a human being (that would be an "exaggeration") 
but a conception evoked by the words, "an artificial man/At a distance, a second-
ary expositor," who is literally a H being of sound." In this most literal sense, 
the words themselves are the speakers of the poem: they tell you that it is 
better without an author, without a poet. They-the words right in front of 
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you-arc the poet for the moment, or if a different poet is to be considered 
(i. e., Wallace Stevens), he must be conceived as only an II accretion" from these 
words. The poem, which is intelligent beyond the intelligence of the poct, 
is thus the creator whenever it is performed by anyone, be it Wallace Stevens 
as he writes it or any reader at any subsequent moment of the text's history. 
Elsewhere in the same lyric the poet is called "X": he cannot be named 
because he is indefinite. Two levels of ambiguity are involved: 1) the poet X 
is both the text and the performer, because at the moment of performance the 
two become one; 2) the poet X is any performer who enacts the language by 
either writing or reading it. Thus the crucial ambiguities of the poem are to be 
found in those small relational terms, the pronouns and the prepositions, in 
which a multiplicity of identifications between poet, text, and audience can be 
played out. For example, two of a number of ways we are to read II From him, 
collect" are 
We (all the performers of the poem) come together here by means 
of him (this conception of the poet) that is part of this language. 
We (all the words of the poem) come together here through him (the 
actual author who wrote the poem). 
The key to this riddle poem lies in the preposition II of" in the title, II The 
Creations of Sound" : obviously poems are creations in sound, but the things of 
which they speak-including even the poet-arc creations by sound.1 
In this poem poetic ambiguity, which is not the same thing as indeterminacy, 
is used to portray the ambiguities inherent in language itself. Because a poem is 
language, we can say that in one sense the poem is the poet, that in another sense· 
it is the text, and that in still another it is the reader (but notice how arid 
the idea becomes in my prose!). In a recently discovered letter to R. P. Black-
mur-appearing in Holly Stevens' II Flux 2," The Soutbern Review, 15, No. 4 
(1979), pp. 733-74-Stevens writes that II ambiguity does not mean obfuscation. 
The clearest possible definition of things essentially ambiguous leaves ambiguity." 
My discussion of Ie The Creations of Sound" illustrates my more general 
quarrel with Doggett: generally speaking, the enigmas in Stevens' verse are 
not inscruitible and the thought which they work to conceal is anything but 
undeveloped and indeterminate. Such enigmas are in fact riddles resolvable 
according to a consistent self-reflexive model, one based on the idea that a poem 
may talk literally about its own words. In many of the early poems, at least those 
published after 1916, and almost all the later ones, Stevens centers the theme 
of the creative imagination, not on the nineteenth-century ideal of a genius-
originator but on the here-and-now of the language that is being performed. 
It is not that he shifts the focus of concern from the poet to the readerj it is 
rather that he thematizes the language of the text-performance itself, which 
he sees incorporating botb poet and reader. As one aphorism from the" Adagia .. 
has it, a poem may reveal a " poetry of words": II Poetry is a poetic conception, 
1 Much of my discussion of "The Creations of Sound" appears in my review of 
Tbe Sourbe171 Review's Fall, 1979 Stevc;q;:; {:c;p,t((nniaJ i§su~ ip. Tbe TFaJ/al?~ 
StcvC1IS Journal, (1980), 26-32, 
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however expressed. A poem is poetry expressed in words. But in a poem 
there is a poetry of words. Obviously, a poem may consist of several pactries." 
Doggett himself seems close to this very idea when he notices how in some 
poems references to the act 9£ readi~g suggests the creative imagination (pp. 
59-62) or when he talks of the ghost in "Two Tales of Lia.doff" and "The 
Weeping Burgher" as suggesting the absent poet who haunts the poem (p. 79). 
But Doggett is far from incorporating these insights into SOfie recurrent and 
specifiable theory; in fact he uses the very passages referring to the act of 
reading to illustrate a discussion of Stevens' indeterminacy. 
Within the scope of a review like this present one, I have no space to 
demonstrate that "The Ceations of Sound" is the rule and not the exception. 
Neither can I discuss the enormous questions raised by the idea of a literal 
" poetry of words." 2 And yet I do wish to propose, at least, that Stevens' obscurity 
derives from a very different source than the one Doggett suggests: where 
he sees the enigmas issuing from thought that, out of its own lack of formation, 
resists precise definition, I see the thought not only fully formed but remarkably 
powerful, so much so in fact that it "plays" with highly educated readers 
in the way a magician uses legerdemain to play with an audience of children. 
\.Vhy are we so easily deceived? One reason is that the poem's subject is 
unexpectedly and liter,ally under our noses. Nothing is so elusive as the obvious. 
Of course this is not to say that there is only one idea in a Stevens poem and 
that a piece can only be read in a single way, but this principle of conceptual 
pluralism is part of the polysemantic nature of the artistic text in general 
and would apply equally to works of other writers whose thought is more 
manifestly determinate. 
The deception involved in this "poetry of words" derives from the repre-
sentational power of language itself, which as so many philosophers and linguists 
emphasize, makes itself "invisible ,. to our attention so that we can focus 
instead on the thing to which it is referring. It is a simple principle but a 
slippery one nevertheless. Consider this line from "Credences of Summer": 
"It is the visible rock, the audible .... " On the screen of his mind, a reader 
could picture a mountain with perhaps the wind howling around it. But in 
context the verse is also to be read as a reference to the poem's language, which 
is also visible and audible. In the lines following this verse the rock is 
called "a sure repose," "this present ground," and "the vividest respose." In 
short, the one immediate and impregnable thing the voice of "Credences" can 
believe is the language of "Credences" itself. "The word," stays Stevens in 
ar ... other aphorism from the" Adagia," "must be the thing it represents; otherwise, 
it is a symbol. It is a question of identity." The" question of identity" is in 
part a question of reference, of taking" rock," say, as either a mountain or a 
word. But in a poem like "Credences" and "The Creations of Sound" is not 
2 I am writing a book on this entire question, A Poetry of TVords: A Study 
of Self-Reference in lVallace Ste-uens. See my "The Semiotic Poetry of \Vallace 
Stevens," Semiotica, 23, No. 1/2 (1978), 78-79, and ", Certain Phenomena of 
Sound' : An Illustration of Wallace Stevens' Poetry of Words," TSLL, 20 (1978), 
599-614. 
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a matter of either/or. The" question of identity" may also suggest the 
deceptive play, in poems like these, of two modes of reference in one and the 
srune text. 
Doggett, it is clear, dislikes the notion of this kind of secrecy in the verse, the 
idea, in his words, of " the poem's sealed letter to the reader, to be opened by the 
poet or some ideal intuitive critic" (pp. 43-44). But why would Stevens' 
" ideal" reader be the one to uncover his deception? The possibleness of poetry, 
we recall, depends on the lack of intelligibility. "Poetry," Stevens admits in one 
Latimer letter " .. , cannot be made suddenly to drop all its rags and stand out 
naked, fully disclosed." It should also be noted that in the letters Stevens' 
consuming desire for privacy in his personal life and his religious commitment 
to poetry seem part of one ,another. He is the kind of man who can write 
to Hi Simons that "there is a kind of secrecy between the poet and the poem, 
which, once violated, affects the integrity of the poet." VVhen he writes of 
other authors, he sometimes has this same relation in mind, as when he speaks 
in a letter to Barbara Church "of the difficulty Vah~ry shared with other poets 
of not being explicit as to his real conception, which he likes to suggest or 
imply, not state." 
In "Notes toward a Supreme Fiction" we read that one of the aims of poetry 
is "plainly to propound." On the other hand, Stevens' aim is also to write 
genuine poetry, not just versified essays about language and the performance of 
the poem. The letters reveal that the French Symbolist ideal of "pure" poetry 
exerted a profound influence upon him, especially in the early years. Hence the 
conflict: the more clearly defined theory becomes in the poetry, the more didactic 
the final result tends to be, for even theories about poetry would constitute 
a pollutant in verse striving in some degree to be "pure." Stevens' resolution 
is to bury his thinking within the strategies of the text, in "the secretions of the 
words," to borrow a phrase from "The Lack of Repose." As the pun on 
" secretions" suggests, poetry is to conceal meaning as it releases it. In another 
letter to Hi Simons, Stevens admits that "a man who wrote with the idea of 
being deliberately obscure would be an imposter. But that is not the same 
thing as a man who allows a difficult thing to remain difficult because, if he 
explained it, it would, to his way of thinking, destroy it." 
Of course Stevens is not the only one who wants his enigmas to keep his 
poetry pure. Doggett's point about "the poem's sealed letter" is interesting 
because the question of actual secrecy is almost never raised in connection with 
the obscurity and, as I say, today discussion of even his obscurity is comparatively 
rare. It seems that the more enshrined Stevens became in the American academy 
as one of the great poets of the century, the greater the tendency to leave his 
obscurity in the golden mist of its apparent indeterminacy. To borrow from my 
earlier analogy, a large part of the child who watches the magician requires won-
der, the same part that does not want to see through the mystery of its O\¥ll 
astonishment. The secrecy I am imputing to Stevens is a function of not only 
certain features within a text, but a dynamic between a text and a certain 
kind of audience, one that reads and valorizes poetry within a given field 
of expectation. The more one reads the Letters the deeper the impression that 
Stevens wanted not so much to inform an audience as to train one. Secrecy 
I, 
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after all is a form of control, and the Letters do reveal a man who, to say the 
least, liked to control things that were important to him. In one letter to 
Latimer, after explaining the role of the letter C in <I The Comedian as the Letter 
C," Stevens requests that" if you refer to the role of the letter C in this poem, do, 
please, refer to it as your own explanation and not as mine, although it is mine." 
"Every poem," declares Stevens in another aphorism from the "Adagia," "is 
a poem within a poem: the poem of the idea ... vithin the poem of the 
words." Here is the same "question of identity" mentioned by the aphorism 
cited a moment ago: we may treat a word in terms of the idea it evokes (as 
if the word "rock" were the image of a mountain) or we may treat it as a 
thing in itself. According to Doggett, however, "the poem of the words" 
refers to the" given" of a work and "the poem of the idea" to its "possible-
ness" (pp. 42-43). Here he is not quite following Vendler, who begins On 
Extended Wings discussing the two "poems" as if they were markers for the 
old form/content opposition. And yet the effect of Doggett's whole book leads us 
to infer essentially the same creed as Vendler's: protect Stevens' art from his 
thought by first making-believe the two are separate and then showing reverence 
for the former and contempt for the latter. On the contrary, the most 
extraordinary part of Stevens' art is his thought. 
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A Literature Without Qualities: American Literature Since 194) by Warner 
Berthoff. Berkeley, Los Angeles. London: University of California Press, 
1979. Pp. 204. $10.95. 
Certain works of fiction, as everybody knows, manipulate not 'Only distance but 
height. Flaubert, narrating his movement toward Y onville, draws closer not 
only horizontally but from above. And Hardy, especially Hardy, renders his 
world, at crucial points, as if from the Goodyear blimp. One rarely thinks of 
expository works as if they manipulate height in any way analogous to works of 
fiction. Yet that is the illusion that Warner Berthoff's book most firmly 
leaves-an elevated, Jovian ordering of a long, diverse period in our cultural life. 
The illusion of height has something to do with the tone of the scholarship: 
footnoting Barthes' The Pleasures of the Text, Berthoff remarks that it is 
translated "(very accurately)." It has something to do with the style, which 
is heavy, at times involuted, and fond of laying out the collective traits of 
"us." "How, most particularly, within our inter-locking system of collabor-
ative-competitive existence (of which language itself is the most extended, 
but our established political custom and economic division of labor scarcely less 
so), do we respond to and impinge upon one another as centers or as vessels of 
energy and possibility?" And the Olympian angle of observation has quite a bit 
to do with the scale of the book: a work on the whole of American literature 
since the war-some thirty-five years-all done in one hundred seventy-seven pages 
of small format text. But the illusion of height finally has most to do with the 
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quality of Berthoff's judgments. Taking the measure of thirty-five years of 
American literature, he judges it against certain prior, transcendent standards; 
and having so judged it, he decides that he doesn't like it very well. 
The concept that forms the title, a literature" without qualities," comes from the 
title of the novel by Robert Musil. What it means, as Bertholf extends and 
applies it, is that American literature since the war retreats from the larger world 
of consequence and historical significance, retreats moreover from a continuity 
with its predecessors, often opting for small exercises in entertainment, 
virtUOllSity. and solipsistic self-amusement. On the question of magnitude, 
Berthoff measures the scope and ambition of works since the war, finding that 
nobody any longer seeks to write a masterpiece. Of those areas of literature 
that have engaged most readers and writers on the subject-the emergence of a 
brilliant group of Jewish novelists, the extraordinary ingenuity with which 
certain writers of fiction have sought to move beyond the possibilities of 
realism, the vigor of the drama, the altogether different voice of women in 
the literature of the past three decades, the consolidation of an authoritative 
literature by and about Blacks, the movement of poetry beyond a rather limited 
canon of neo-rnetaphysicals-none of these interest Berthoff particularly. Of 
the Jewish novelists, for example, lVlaJamud is mentioned in one collective 
footnote, Roth is cited, in a series among others, as a maker of "expert prose 
entertainments," and Bellow is discussed slightly and rather airily. Of the experi-
mentalists, Barth's fiction is cited twice, with minimal respect, Barthelme is 
gathered, among others, as a perpetrator of "resolute performative novelties," a 
gathering which also includes the only mention of Coover. Of the drama, 
Tennessee Williams is never mentioned. Of the women, Berthoff seems inter-
mittently fascinated by Joyce Carol Oatesj but Mary IVlcCarthy is never 
mentioned, nor is Grace Paley, nor Alison Lurie, nor Joan Didion. Of the 
Blacks, Ellison gets passing respect, Baldwin a footnote, and Toni Morrison no 
mention. And of the poets, it is really only Lo,ovell who engages his sustained 
attention, Roethke, for a single example, appearing in a series, among nine others, 
as an instance of the period's struggle" with its own will to self-destruction." 
Well then, what does he write about? Wallace Stevens for one, Henry 
Miller for another. The commentary on those two writers makes up roughly 
a third of the book If one recalls that both writers achieved their reputations 
and completed most of their major works before the end of the war, one is 
entitled to wonder what they are doing there, especially in the face of the 
dismissal of so much else. The rationale, of course, is that both are seen as 
precursors. In the case of Miller, the linkage is pursued tenaciously but unper-
suasively. It is true that Miller seems, in retrospect, to open areas of language 
and subject matter and to establish a relationship to experience that can be 
found in much fiction since. But that he is the pivot upon which post-war fiction 
turns seems to me dubious. Comparable claims could be made for a substantial 
number of figures from Kafka to S. J. Perelman. The linkage between Stevens 
and poetry since is less tenaciously pursued; yet it is surely implicit or the 
treatment of Stevens would have no justification. The idea, in any case, that the 
poetry of the last thirty-five years can best be seen by reference to Stevens seems 
to me a preposterous assumption. And the reader for whom it is good to be 
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alive and reading in these disquieting times will suspect, by the time he reaches 
that point, that Berthoff's sustained treatment of Stevens is a not-very-subtle means 
of patronizing a large number of poets since, who can be seen, in comparison to 
the Master of Hartford, to be triflers. 
There is always room in the world for jeremiads. And no doubt our official 
sense of Qur own literature is in need of refinement, a refinement that may well 
necessitate a kind of virtuoso nay-saying. It is a function that Berthoff's book 
sometimes serves, in a sustained passage, for example, in which he pays tribute to 
the awesome accomplishment of Gravity's Rainbow while strenuously pointing 
out Pynchon's final inability to put us in touch with ourselves. Right or wrong, 
it is a passage that carries authority and conviction. But .that angle of insight-
the little boy in" The Emperor's New Clothes "-is not finally the one that gives 
the dominant tone to Berthoff's book, Rather it is the tone of a fairly ungenerous 
imagination for which the most characteristic gesture is not buoyant opposition 
but the back of the hand. The period, needless to say, deserves better. 
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